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INTRODUCTION
From the initial returns, one might believe that during its
2003-04 Term the Supreme Court dealt the Bush Administration a
defeat in the war on terrorism.1 Two cases, both handed down in the
last few days of the Term, seemed to give rise to the popular notion
that the judiciary had thoroughly rebuked the executive branch.2
One case, Rasul v. Bush, held that, for the first time, the federal dis-
trict courts may review the grounds for detaining alien enemy combat-
ants held outside the United States.3 In a second case, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, the Court required that American citizens detained in the
war have access to a lawyer and a fair hearing before a neutral judge to
challenge their status as enemy combatants. 4
-t Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall);
Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department ofJustice, 2001-03. I thank Peter Berkowitz andJudge
Pat Wald for their comments. Patrick Hein and Will Trachman provided excellent re-
search assistance.
I See, e.g., Andrew Buncombe, Court Defies White House With Camp Delta Ruling, INDEP.
(U.K.), June 29, 2004, at 24 ("In what represented President Bush's most damaging legal
defeat since he assumed office, the court ruled 6-3 that ... prisoner[s] [taken] as part of
the so-called 'war on terror' could not be held indefinitely without access to lawyers or the
courts."); Stephen Henderson, Detainees Win Access to Courts: Supreme Court Rulings Deliver a
Legal Blow to the Administration's Antiterrorism Policy, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 29, 2004, at Al
("The U.S. Supreme Court repudiated a central legal doctrine of the administration's an-
titerrorism efforts yesterday .... ); Steve Lash, Court Clarifies Issues of Individual Rights: Bush
Administration Rebuffed as Justices Say Detainees Must be Afforded Due Process, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., July 4, 2004, at B5 ("The court handed the Bush administration several stinging
setbacks.").
2 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
3 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483.
4 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 559.
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While the Court has unwisely injected itself into military matters,
closer examination reveals that these two decisions affirm the Admin-
istration's fundamental legal approach to the war on terrorism and
leave it with sufficient flexibility to achieve its future goals effectively.
Despite the pleas of legal and media elites,5 the Justices did not turn
the clock back to September 10, 2001. The Court agreed that the
United States is at war against the al Qaeda terrorist network and the
Taliban militia that supports it.6 The Court found that Congress has
authorized that war.7 The Justices implicitly recognized that the
United States may use all of the tools of war to fight a new kind of
enemy that has no territory, no population, and no desire to spare
innocent civilian life.8 The days when society considered terrorism
merely a law enforcement problem and when our forces against ter-
rorism were limited to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, federal
prosecutors, and the criminal justice system will not return.
Nonetheless, the Court emphasized the importance ofjudicial re-
view in assessing the cases of individual detainees captured in the war
on terrorism. 9 The Court made clear that it would no longer consider
military decisions in wartime to be outside the competence of the fed-
eral courts.10 Instead, the judiciary would review the legality of the
detention of enemy combatants."I The expansion of judicial review
into military decisions represents an unprecedented formal and func-
tional intrusion by the federal courts into the Executive's traditional
powers. At the formal level, the decisions in Rasul and Hamdi re-
quired the Court effectively to overrule a precedent from the end of
World War 11.12 At a broader, functional level, these decisions will
require the judiciary to make factual and legal judgments, in the
5 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Hon. Nathaniel R. Jones et al. in Support of Petition-
ers, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696); Editorial, The Supreme Court and Sept. 11, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003, at A24 (urging the Supreme Court to consider the Hamdi and Rasul
cases and to stand up for civil liberties).
6 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-19.
7 See id. at 517-18.
8 See id. at 518 ("We conclude that detention of [enemy combatants captured during
military operations in Afghanistan], for the duration of the particular conflict in which
they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise
of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the President to use.").
9 See, e.g., id. at 528-29 (discussing the judicial test generally used to balance serious,
competing interests such as an individual's right to due process and the government's
security interests); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484-85 (discussing the availability ofjudicial review to
nonresident aliens).
10 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004) ("[T]his Court has recognized the fed-
eral courts' power to review applications for habeas relief in a wide variety of cases involv-
ing Executive detention, in wartime as well as in times of peace.").
I I See id. at 483.
12 SeeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 781 (1950) (holding that German nation-
als convicted by a U.S. military commission after World War II did not have the right to the
writ of habeas corpus).
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midst of war, that press the federal courts far beyond their normal
areas of expertise. These decisions also create potential conflict with
the other branches of government in managing warfare.
This Article discusses four issues. Part I explains why the events
of September 11, 2001 demonstrate that terrorism has become a mat-
ter for war, rather than simply a crime. Part II argues that the govern-
ment's authority to detain enemy combatants without charges is a
natural outcome of the Supreme Court's willingness to accept the
judgment of the political branches. Part III discusses the Court's deci-
sion to require a certain level of due process for enemy combatants,
regardless of citizenship. Part IV questions whether the comparative
institutional competencies of the judiciary make federal courts a good
choice to carry out national security and foreign policy.
I
FROM CRIME TO WAR
On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda operatives flew two hijacked
planes into the World Trade Center towers in New York City and a
third into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Passengers appeared to
have brought down a fourth plane, which may have been headed to-
ward either the Capitol or the White House. The attacks proved dev-
astating-killing about three thousand people and causing economic
losses totaling billions of dollars. Al Qaeda intended these attacks to
eliminate the political, military, and financial leadership of the coun-
try. Both the President and Congress agreed that the attacks repre-
sented the start of an armed conflict between the United States and
the al Qaeda terrorist network. 13
It may be useful at the outset to discuss the difference between al
Qaeda and September 11 on the one hand, and the traditional wars
that had characterized the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the
other. While al Qaeda had conducted a series of attacks against the
United States prior to September 11, including the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing, September 11 demonstrated the unconventional na-
ture of the war and of the enemy.' 4 Al Qaeda is not a nation-state, nor
13 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224,
224 (2001); Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § 1 (a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833 (Nov. 16,
2001).
14 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2047, 2054 n.24 (2005) (discussing the "'unconven-
tional nature"' of"'the current conflict"' (citing Brief for the Respondents at 16, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696))); M. Scott Holcomb, View from the Legal
Frontlines, 4 CHI. J. INr'L L. 561, 562 (2003) ("The US, a nation that complies with the law
of war, had to fight against an unconventional terrorist force that does not comply with the
law of war."); Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in Foreign Relations, 2004
SuP. CT. REv. 111, 145 ("It is difficult ... to sort out the implications of [the long-recog-
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is it an alter ego supported by a nation-state. Al Qaeda does not have
a territory or population, nor does it seek to defend or acquire any
specific territory. 15 Unlike an indigenous rebel group, al Qaeda is not
attempting to protect territory or to replace an existing regime
through an intrastate civil war.
Moreover, al Qaeda's operations are unconventional and, accord-
ing to strategic analysts, asymmetric. 16 Al Qaeda soldiers do not wear
uniforms and they do not operate in conventional units or force struc-
tures.17 Rather, al Qaeda personnel, material, and leadership move
through the open channels of the international economy and organ-
ize themselves in covert cells. 18 Al Qaeda does not seek to confront
and defeat its enemies' armed forces on the battlefield. Instead, it
seeks to achieve its political aims by launching surprise attacks-pri-
marily on civilian targets-using unconventional weapons and tactics,
such as concealing bombs on trains and using airplanes as guided mis-
siles.19 Al Qaeda does not seek victory by defeating the enemy's forces
and negotiating a political settlement, but by attempting to demoral-
ize an enemy's society and coercing it to take desired action. 20
Another factor distinguishes the war against al Qaeda from previ-
ous wars. America waged previous conflicts on foreign battlefields,
while the home front remained safe behind the distances of two
oceans. In the present conflict, the battlefield can exist anywhere,
nized history of placing enemy nationals at a legal disadvantage] for the unconventional
armed conflict between the United States and al Qaeda, a non-state entity of transnational
character with uncertain membership."); John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terror-
ism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 429 (2003) [hereinafter Yoo, Judicial Review] ("The uncon-
ventional nature of the war [on terrorism], and of the enemy, has called upon the United
States government to undertake a full spectrum of domestic and international
responses.").
15 See, e.g., Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Law of Armed Conflict in the Global War on Terror:
International Lawyers Fighting the Last War, 19 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'V 309, 310
(2005) ("Security threats are no longer from nation-states alone, but increasingly from
rogue, international criminals operating across the borders of nation-states."); John Yoo,
War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 816 (2004) ("Terrorist
groups like al Qaeda . .. have no population or territory to defend .... ).
16 See William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-September 11 th Proposal to Ration-
alize the Laws of War, 73 Miss. L.J. 639, 673-74 (2004) ("United States armed forces.., are
distinctly disadvantaged by a grossly asymmetrical legal framework in which morally infer-
ior warriors enjoy all its protections but respect none of its obligations." (citation omit-
ted));John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 729, 749-50 (2004) ("The easier availability
of weapons technology, the emergence of rogue states, and the rise of international terror-
ism have presented more immediate threats to national security than those from attack by
other nation-states .... [T]hese different developments mean that an attack can occur
without warning, because its preparation has been covert and it can be launched by ter-
rorists hiding within the civilian population.").
17 PAUL L. WILLIAMS, AL QAEDA: BROTHERHOOD OF TERROR vii-viii (2002).
18 See OLIVER Roy, GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH 52-54 (2004).
19 See id.
20 See id. at 55-57.
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and there is no strict division between the front and home. Foreign
forces launched the September 11 attacks, for example, from within
the United States, using American airliners, against targets wholly
within the United States. While American territory has witnessed for-
eign attacks in the past-most notably the attack on Pearl Harbor that
launched American entry in World War II-September 11 constituted
the first major attack on the continental United States, and against
major American cities, since the War of 1812.
In the weeks after September 11, the Bush Administration de-
cided to pursue al Qaeda by taking offensive military action abroad.
In October 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan, forced al
Qaeda from its bases, and ultimately removed from power the Taliban
militia that had harbored al Qaeda.21 The Bush Administration has
since supported a friendly, elected government led by former rebel
leader Hamid Karzai. The United States has carried out military oper-
ations against al Qaeda terrorists in places such as the Philippines,
Africa, and the Middle East. As a result, it has captured hundreds of
al Qaeda and Taliban fighters and sent them to the U.S. Naval Base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Motivated in part by Iraq's suspected links to
terrorist groups generally and al Qaeda specifically, the United States
and its allies invaded Iraq in March 2003 and removed Saddam Hus-
sein from power.22
War against al Qaeda also has an important defensive dimension.
Al Qaeda operatives launched the initial attack against the United
States from within. Al Qaeda does not show any sign of reducing its
efforts to launch another attack on the scale of September 11.23 Law
enforcement has uncovered al Qaeda cells in cities such as Buffalo,
New York and Portland, Oregon. It has detained a resident alien who
intended to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge and intercepted at least one
21 See, e.g., Yoo, Judicial Review, supra note 14, at 429-30. For my earlier discussions of
the legal issues surrounding the Afghanistan war, see RobertJ. Delahunty & John Yoo, The
President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations
and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 487 (2002); John C.
Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207 (2003).
22 The primary justifications for the war in Iraq were Saddam Hussein's continuing
pursuit of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program and Iraq's flouting of United
Nations Security Council resolutions. SeeJohn Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97
Am. J. INT'L L. 563, 565-66 (2003).
23 Some reports even indicate that new bin Laden associates are eyeing soft targets on
U.S. soil. SeeJoseph Curl, Stopping bin Laden is 'Greatest Challenge,', WASH. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2005, at Al ("President Bush yesterday said stopping Osama bin Laden from committing a
new attack on U.S. soil is 'the greatest challenge of our day,' but vowed that the United
States eventually will bring to justice the mastermind of the September 11 terrorist at-
tacks.... [T] he president noted that the al Qaeda terrorist recently came out of hiding to
urge his chief ally in Iraq, Abu Musab Zarqawi, to attack Americans. 'Bin Laden's message
is a telling reminder that al Qaeda still hopes to attack us on our own soil,' Mr. Bush
said.").
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American citizen in Chicago who had planned to explode a radiologi-
cal dispersal device, known as a "dirty bomb," in a major American
city. After the attacks, the federal government investigated and de-
tained hundreds of illegal aliens within the United States with possible
links to the terrorists. Al Qaeda agents taken into custody within the
United States have been detained without criminal charge as enemy
combatants. Congress passed the USA Patriot Act to broaden the
powers of the FBI and the intelligence community to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance of international terrorists inside the United
States. 24 Congress created a Department of Homeland Security that
incorporated twenty-two separate agencies with responsibilities for do-
mestic security.25
It is this domestic dimension that has produced misunderstand-
ing of the fundamental nature of the conflict with al Qaeda. Some
believe that terrorism is a tactic-not an enemy-which implies that
the war on terrorism is a problem for the criminal law, as it was before
September 11, 2001.26 The war on terrorism is no different than the
war on drugs, the war on poverty, or the war on crime, the argument
goes, as these "wars" also have nonstate actors, such as drug cartels
and organized crime groups. September 11 is different in kind rather
than degree. Perhaps the misunderstanding arises from the differ-
ences between the political rhetoric of the "war on terrorism" and the
actual conflict, which is between the United States and the al Qaeda
terrorist organization and its affiliates. The United States is not at war
with every group in the world that uses terrorist tactics. Furthermore,
as discussed below, al Qaeda is different from drug cartels or organ-
ized crime groups, and hence its defeat is more a matter for war than
criminal justice.
Several factors distinguish the war against al Qaeda from a large-
scale criminal investigation or a broad, persistent social problem.
First, al Qaeda represents a foreign threat that originates outside the
United States. Al Qaeda's foreign element makes it different from
homegrown terrorism, such as Timothy McVeigh's 1995 bombing of
the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which is an
appropriate subject for the criminal justice system. Second, al Qaeda
is unlike a crime organization in that it seeks purely political ends,
24 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, §§ 201-16, 115 Stat. 272, 278-90 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
25 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
26 See Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt,
and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1, 1 (2002) ("[T]here are
important deontological, communitarian, and consequentialist reasons why the [Septem-
ber 11] attacks-and terrorism in general-should be constructed as criminal attacks.").
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rather than purely financial gain. Al Qaeda attacked the United
States because it wants the United States to withdraw its military and
political presence from the Middle East. Al Qaeda may seek financial
gain to fund its terrorist operations to achieve that goal, but financial
advancement is not its purpose.27 Third, al Qaeda has proven that it is
capable of inflicting a degree of violence and destruction that crosses
the line separating crime and war. Although the precise location of
this line may not be certain, it seems clear that with approximately
three thousand deaths and billions of dollars in damage, the Septem-
ber 11 attacks crossed this line.
II
JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court accepted the political branches'
basic decision to characterize the September 11 attacks as war.28 In so
doing, the Court rejected arguments characterizing terrorism solely as
criminal activity and denied the notion that war could occur only
against nations.29
Northern Alliance troops, a coalition of groups allied with the
United States and opposed to the Taliban militia, captured Yaser
Hamdi during the fighting in Afghanistan and turned him over to
U.S. armed forces. 30 The military sent Hamdi to the naval station at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and, upon discovery that Hamdi had been
born in the United States, transferred him to a naval brig in South
Carolina.3' He was not charged with a crime. 32 Hamdi's father filed a
writ of habeas corpus seeking his son's release, claiming that as an
American citizen Hamdi could not be held without criminal charges,
access to a tribunal, or counsel.33 He based his argument on 18
U.S.C. § 4001(a), which declares, "No citizen shall be imprisoned or
27 For example, GlobalSecurity.org states that "al-Qaeda's current goal is to establish a
pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist
groups to overthrow regimes it deems 'non-Islamic' and expelling Westerners and non-
Muslims from Muslim countries." Global Security.org, A1-Qaeda, http://www.global-
security.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2005). The Council
on Foreign Relations states that al Qaeda's "Goals and Objectives of Jihad" are "(I)
[e]stablishing the rule of God on earth; (2) [a]ttaining martyrdom in the cause of God;
and (3) [p]urification of the ranks of Islam from the elements of depravity." Council on
Foreign Relations, Terrorism: Questions & Answers: Al-Qaeda, http://cfrterrorism.org/
groups/alqaeda2.html#Q15 (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
28 See 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion).
29 See Brief for Petitioners at 12-13, 17 n.8, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696); Bruce
Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1873 (2004) (arguing that the post-Sep-
tember 11 denouement constitutes a "state of emergency" rather than an outright "war").
30 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
31 See id.
32 See id. at 510-11.
33 See id. at 511.
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otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress. '34 The government did not challenge Hamdi's right to
seek habeas relief; instead, it argued that he was detained lawfully as
an enemy combatant under the laws of war.35 To support its argument
that Hamdi was an enemy combatant, the government submitted a
declaration from a Defense Department official stating that Hamdi
had traveled to Afghanistan in the summer of 2001, affiliated himself
with a Taliban military unit, and surrendered while armed. 36
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
government could constitutionally detain a U.S. citizen as an enemy
combatant and what process the government owes to an individual
who seeks to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant. 37
These issues raised the basic questions of whether the September 11
attacks constituted an act of war, which branch of the government had
the authority to decide that question, and what powers were available
to the President if, indeed, the United States was at war. 38 If Septem-
ber 11, for example, merely constituted a criminal act rather than an
act of war, then Hamdi's detention was illegal under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, which require indictment or presentment, 39 the
right to counsel, 40 the right to remain silent,4' and a speedy trial.42
Hamdi's detention also would have violated § 4001 (a), because no
congressional act had overridden the rights of criminal defendants to
be free from detention without criminal charge.
A four-Justice plurality of the Court agreed with the government
that the September 11 attacks had initiated a state of war, that the
Afghanistan conflict was part of that war, and that enemy combatants
could be detained without criminal charge as part of that war. 43 The
Court avoided the Solicitor General's argument that the President
could detain Hamdi pursuant solely to the President's authority to
34 See id. at 515.
35 See id. at 510, 516.
36 See id. at 512-13. The Supreme Court refers to this document as the Mobbs Decla-
ration. See id. at 512.
37 See id. at 509.
38 See id. at 517-21.
39 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.").
40 See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."); see alsoJohnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (holding that in federal courts the accused must either have or
waive counsel before the government deprives him of his life or liberty).
41 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
42 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial.").
43 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517-19. Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion, which
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer joined.
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conduct war under Article II of the Constitution. 4 4 This sidestep was
possible because Congress had enacted a statute on September 18,
2001 authorizing the President to use "all necessary and appropriate
force" against "nations, organizations, or persons" he determines are
responsible for the September 11 attacks. 45 The political branches'
agreement that the September 11 attacks initiated a war, and that the
President could pursue that conflict in Afghanistan, was enough to
trigger deference on the part of the Court. 46 The Court did not in-
quire whether the basic facts of Hamdi's case satisfied the statute, or
whether the statute satisfied the Constitution.47 The Court did not
ask whether the September 11 attacks had indeed constituted an act
of war for constitutional purposes or whether sufficient evidence exis-
ted to show that al Qaeda was responsible for those attacks. 48 The
Court also did not examine whether the Taliban regime was suffi-
ciently associated with al Qaeda to fall within the September 18
authorization. 49
Once the Court found that the September 11 attacks initiated a
state of war with al Qaeda, it then accepted the next portion of the
Administration's legal framework for the war on terrorism: the lesser
power to detain combatants, which has been understood to fall within
the greater authority to use force against the enemy.50 As the Court
recognized, the purpose of detention in the military context is not to
punish, but merely to prevent combatants from returning to the
fight.51 In fact, such detention is the merciful, humanitarian alterna-
tive to a practice of granting no quarter to the enemy.5 2 After noting
that the laws of war permitted the detention without criminal charge
of Confederate soldiers during the Civil War, the Court observed that
"[a] citizen, no less than an alien, can be 'part of or supporting forces
44 See id. at 517.
45 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224,
224 (2001).
46 The Court stated that "It] here can be no doubt that individuals who fought against
the United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have
supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals
Congress sought to target in passing" the authorization to use force. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at
510.
47 See id. at 518-19.
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See id. at 518; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942) ("An important incident to
the conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the military command not only to repel
and defeat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who
in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war.").
51 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-19.
52 See id. at 518. The power of detention extends even to U.S. citizens, as it did in the
case of Ex parte Quiin, in which the Court upheld the World War II detention and trial by
military commission of Nazi saboteurs, one of whom apparently was a citizen. See Quiin,
317 U.S. at 20, 48.
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hostile to the United States or coalition partners' and 'engaged in an
armed conflict against the United States.' '53 No specific congres-
sional authorization for detention was needed, the Court concluded,
"because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield
is a fundamental incident of waging war."5 4
The Court also agreed with the third part of the Administration's
justification for Hamdi's detention.55 Hamdi argued that his deten-
tion was unconstitutional because it was indefinite56-a return to the
idea that terrorism constitutes a fundamentally criminal enterprise.
Hamdi sought a return to September 10, 2001, when the government
arrested terrorists based on probable cause and gave them Miranda
warnings, when grand juries indicted them, and when the law granted
them the rights to attorneys, to a speedy trial, to full knowledge of the
government's case, to depose and call any relevant witnesses, and to
seek Brady evidence, 57 among other rights and privileges. The Court
flatly rejected this argument. 58 The Justices recognized that the
United States may use all of the tools of war to fight a new kind of
enemy that has no territory, no population, and no desire to spare
innocent civilian life.
Accordingly, the Court invoked the standard rule of the law of
war: The government can detain prisoners until the end of a con-
flict. 59 This rule follows from the basic purposes of wartime detention
of enemy combatants. To borrow the plurality's words, "[T]he pur-
pose of detention is to prevent captured individuals from returning to
the field of battle and taking up arms once again."60 The flip side of
this purpose is that once a conflict is over, the relationship between
the nations and populations returns to peace. Once there is peace,
there is no reason to continue to detain captured combatants, and it
becomes the obligation of each nation to prevent its citizens from re-
starting hostilities. 61 The Court stated firmly that "l[t] he United States
may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals legiti-
53 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 (quoting Brief for the Respondents, supra note 14, at 3).
54 Id.
55 See id. at 521.
56 Id.
57 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding the prosecution's suppres-
sion of evidence requested by, and favorable to, an accused violated the defendant's due
process rights when the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment, irrespective of
the good or bad faith of the prosecution).
58 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-35.
59 See id. at 520.
60 Id. at 518.
61 Cf Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (providing that prisoners of war should be re-
leased after hostilities end); Hague Convention (WV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land and its Annex; Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land § 1, ch. 2, art. 20, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 (same); Hague Conven-
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mately determined to be Taliban combatants who engaged in an
armed conflict against the United States. '62 The Court also ruled that
as long as "the record establishes that United States troops are still
involved in active combat in Afghanistan," the authorities may detain
enemy combatants. 63 Thus, the Court accepted the government's ar-
guments that it was premature to identify when the conflict might end
given the ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan. 64
Although the Court recognized the possibility of indefinite deten-
tions, it also acknowledged the "unconventional nature" of the war on
terrorism and suggested that if hostilities continued for "two genera-
tions," Hamdi's detention might indeed exceed the government's war
powers. 65 Aside from recalling Justice O'Connor's fondness for mea-
suring time by generations, 66 the Court did not provide any reason
why after two generations it may be necessary to reconsider the laws of
war.67 If American troops remain engaged in combat in Afghanistan
in 2040, the laws of war do not require the United States to release
Hamdi or other Taliban detainees. Although the United States may
decide to release older or less dangerous prisoners as a matter of pol-
icy, the Court identified no constitutional rule requiring the release of
prisoners within a specific period of time if hostilities are ongoing. 68
Upholding detention as central to the Executive's war powers is
perhaps the most significant aspect of the Court's terrorism decisions.
Afghanistan presented the easiest case to justify the detention of en-
emy combatants: a traditional conflict between two nation-states that
occurred primarily on the battlefield. It may be hard to believe given
the context of the military conflict, but the United States was lucky
that al Qaeda and its Taliban allies responded to the American pres-
ence in Afghanistan and deployed fighters in a battlefield setting,
where superior American air and ground power gave the United
States the advantage and permitted it to capture many operatives.
However, al Qaeda will not make the same mistake twice. Rather, al
Qaeda seeks to infiltrate operatives into our society with the goal of
tion (II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 20, July 29, 1899, 32
Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 (same).
62 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (quotation omitted).
63 Id.
64 See id.
65 Id. at 520.
66 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("We expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest ap-
proved today.").
67 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (suggesting that if the government continued to hold
Hamdi in custody for two generations, his detention might last for the rest of his life, and
"if the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts
that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding [the authority to
detain for the duration of a conflict] may unravel").
68 See id.
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launching surprise attacks designed to inflict massive civilian casual-
ties. Jose Padilla, whose case the Supreme Court dismissed because it
was improperly brought in the Southern District of New York,69 pro-
vides an example of al Qaeda's efforts to recruit American citizens
who can better escape detection. 70 Although sporadic fighting in Af-
ghanistan continues, 71 domestic targets such as Chicago O'Hare air-
port, New York harbor, and the Mexican and Canadian borders will
be the front lines of the future. If the Court had prevented the gov-
ernment from detaining citizens who have decided to become ter-
rorists, it would have seriously handicapped the nation's ability to
prevent attacks and to obtain better intelligence on our enemy's
plans.
III
WAR AND DUE PROCESS
Initially, the Court remained well within the boundaries set by
previous Courts in reviewing the government's war powers to detain
enemy combatants. In the Prize Cases, for example, the Court de-
ferred to the President's determination that the Confederate States'
secession had marked the outbreak of the Civil War.72 It explained
that as the Commander-in-Chief, the President, not the Court, had
the power to decide whether to treat the southern states as "belliger-
ents" and to institute a blockade. 73 The Court did not question the
merits of the President's decision, but stated it must leave such an
evaluation to "the political department of the Government to which
this power was entrusted. '74 As the Court observed, the President en-
joys full discretion in determining what level of force to use when con-
fronted with a crisis. 75 Similarly, after the end of World War II, the
Court held that the question of whether a state of war continued to
69 See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004).
70 The government alleged that Padilla was close to building a "dirty bomb" to be
detonated within the United States. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d
564, 572-73 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
71 See Roy, supra note 18, at 55-57.
72 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862).
73 See id.
74 Id.
75 Id. ("He must determine what degree of force the crisis demands." (quotations
omitted)); seeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) ("Certainly it is not the
function of the Judiciary to entertain private litigation-even by a citizen-which chal-
lenges the legality, the wisdom, or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending
our armed forces abroad or to any particular region."); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Water-
man S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("The President, both as Commander-in-Chief
and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose re-
ports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that
courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the
Executive taken on information properly held secret.").
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exist-despite the apparent cessation of active military operations-
was a political question. 76 During the war, the Court upheld the gov-
ernment's authority to detain enemy combatants, even those who are
U.S. citizens, during wartime. 77 Despite the arguments of a coalition
of law professors, members of the bar, and commentators,7 8 it would
have been remarkable if the Hamdi Court had disregarded this long-
standing framework and challenged the political branches in perhaps
their area of greatest competence. 79
Despite acknowledging the government's power to detain enemy
combatants, the Court then took a wrong turn and overstepped the
traditional boundaries of judicial review. All parties agreed that an
American citizen held as an enemy combatant could challenge his de-
tention through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, s° as had been
the rule since at least Ex parte Milligan.81 In that case, the Court or-
dered the release of an American citizen who had plotted an attack
against Union military installations. 82 The Court noted that the
Union authorities could not detain Milligan without process as long as
"the courts are open and their process unobstructed." 83 Milligan had
been captured well away from the front, had never associated with the
enemy, and was, at most, merely a sympathizer with the Confederate
cause.8 4 The crucial question in Hamdi, then, was not whether habeas
corpus would remain available, but rather how the process ought to
be structured to take into account the government's interests in pro-
tecting national security and the noncriminal nature of the detention,
while providing a sufficient test of the government's evidence to guard
against pretextual detentions.
76 See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 169 (1948) ("Whether and when it would be
open to this Court to find that a war though merely formally kept alive had in fact ended, is
a question too fraught with gravity even to be adequately formulated when not
compelled.").
77 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942) ("Citizenship in the United States of an
enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is
unlawful because in violation of the law of war.").
78 See Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Professors Listed Herein in Support of
Petitioners, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696); Brief for the American
Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-
6696); Brief of International Humanitarian Organizations and Associations of Interna-
tional Journalists as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-
6696).
79 Although Justice O'Connor's opinion drew only a plurality of the Court, Justice
Thomas' dissent agrees with the plurality on these essential points. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at
579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Hamdi's detention falls squarely within the war
powers of the President and the Court should not "second-guess that decision").
80 Id. at 525 (plurality opinion).
81 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
82 See id. at 131.
83 Id. at 121.
84 See id. at 131.
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Viewed at a somewhat higher level of generality, Hamdi called
upon the Court to determine how much information judges need to
perform their habeas function in a wartime detention context. In a
typical executive detention habeas case, for example, a federal court
might review the facts de novo. If the executive claimed, for example,
that an individual posed an imminent threat to public safety and had
to be detained,8 5 a judge might examine witnesses in court and di-
rectly review the records of the detention. The Court could have ac-
cepted the "some evidence" standard, which requires the government
to provide the facts that lead it to believe that a detainee satisfies the
legal standard for status as an enemy combatant.8 6 That standard
seeks to provide the government the maximum flexibility to preserve
its intelligence sources and methods, and to minimize interference
with ongoing military operations. In 1950, in Johnson v. Eisentrager, the
Court held that German prisoners of war convicted by a military com-
mission for war crimes could not seek review of their sentences in a
federal court through a writ of habeas corpus.8 7 According to the
Eisentrager Court:
The writ, since it is held to be a matter of right, would be equally
available to enemies during active hostilities as in the present twi-
light between war and peace. Such trials would hamper the war
effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. They would dimin-
ish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with
wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more effective fet-
tering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is
ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own
civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military
offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely
that the result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict be-
tween judicial and military opinion highly comforting to enemies of
the United States.88
The unconventional nature of the war with al Qaeda makes im-
portant military interests more acute because of the need to interro-
gate enemy combatants for information about future attacks. Unlike
enemies in previous wars, al Qaeda is a stateless network of religious
extremists who do not obey the laws of war, who hide among peaceful
populations, and who seek to launch surprise attacks on civilian
85 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) ("[I]n times of war or
insurrection, when society's interest is at its peak, the Government may detain individuals
whom the Government believes to be dangerous."); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909)
(affirming a governor's detention of an individual to quell an insurrection).
86 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527-28 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("Under
this review, a court would assume the accuracy of the Government's articulated basis for
Hamdi's definition .. .and assess whether that articulated basis was a legitimate one.").
87 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950).
88 Id. at 779.
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targets with the aim of causing massive casualties. They have no
armed forces in the field, no territory to defend, no populace to pro-
tect, and no fear of killing themselves in their attacks. The front line
is not solely a traditional battlefield, and the primary means of con-
ducting the war includes the efforts of military, law enforcement, and
intelligence officers to stop attacks before they occur. Information is
an indispensable primary weapon in the conflict against this new kind
of enemy, and intelligence gathered from captured operatives is per-
haps the most effective means of preventing future terrorist attacks
upon U.S. territory.
Given this understanding of war, de novo judicial review threat-
ens to undermine the effectiveness of the military effort against al
Qaeda. A habeas proceeding could become the forum for recalling
commanders and intelligence operatives from the field into open
court, disrupting overt and covert operations, revealing successful mil-
itary tactics and methods, and forcing the military to shape its activi-
ties to the demands of the judicial process. Indeed, the discovery
orders of the trial judge in Hamdi threatened to achieve exactly these
results. 89 Appropriate concern for such considerations should have
led the Court to adopt the "some evidence" standard, which would
have narrowed judicial inquiry to the facts known to the government
and subject to production in court. Justice Thomas, who observed
that courts "lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess" the bat-
tlefield decisions made by the military and ultimately the President,
agreed with this approach. 90
Joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, 9 1 however, the plurality
imposed vague guidelines for reviewing detentions. 92 Rejecting the
positions of Hamdi and the government, the Court struck the com-
promise that an enemy combatant must receive notice and "a fair op-
portunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
89 The district court rejected the Mobbs Declaration as insufficient to justify Hamdi's
detention and
ordered the Government to turn over numerous materials for in camera re-
view, including copies of all of Hamdi's statements and the notes taken
from interviews with him that related to his reasons for going to Afghani-
stan and his activities therein; a list of all interrogators who had questioned
Hamdi and their names and addresses; statements by members of the
Northern Alliance regarding Hamdi's surrender and capture; a list of the
dates and locations of his capture and subsequent detentions; and the
names and titles of the United States Government officials who made the
determinations that Hamdi was an enemy combatant and that he should be
moved to a naval brig.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 513-14.
90 See id. at 579 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
91 Id. at 539 (Souter, J., concurring).
92 See id. at 553.
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neutral decision maker."9 3 The Court thus transplanted the amor-
phous Mathews v. Eldridge test to determine whether a process meets
the requirement of the Due Process Clause: a balancing of the private
interest affected by government action, the government's interests,
and the costs of providing greater process-all measured in the con-
text of deciding whether more process would reduce government er-
ror.94 That the Court had to resort to a case about the procedural due
process rights that attend the termination of welfare benefits suggests
the extent to which the Court was improvising.
It is difficult to understand how the Mathews test can be applied
with any serious coherence. The values that Mathews calls on the
courts to balance seem obviously difficult-if not impossible-to mea-
sure against any common metric.9 5 The Court's own discussion in
Hamdi bears this out. On the one hand, Justice O'Connor wrote that
an individual citizen's interest in being "free from involuntary con-
finement by his own government without due process of law" is funda-
mental.9 6 On the other hand, the government has a "weighty and
sensitive" interest in preventing enemy combatants from returning to
fight against the United States. 97 The Court could have defined the
government's interest at an even higher level of importance, because
requiring the government to reveal intelligence information-such as
the surveillance of al Qaeda leaders-during habeas proceedings
could prevent the government from most effectively carrying out its
war against al Qaeda. Once defined as victory itself, rather than sim-
ply detaining enemy combatants, the government's interest would
have reached the most compelling level known to American constitu-
tional law. As the Court has said, "It is obvious and unarguable that no
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the
Nation."98
Nevertheless, the Court left unclear how courts should actually
balance these factors. Should a court gauge the government's interest
in protecting the national security by multiplying the number of lives
potentially saved by the reduction in the probability of an attack-
factoring in the uniform value of a life as measured by the Environ-
93 Id. at 533 (plurality opinion).
94 See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
95 See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Art and the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Rise of the
Impressionist School of Constitutional Interpretation, 2004 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 69, 97 ("A case
that dealt with disability benefits rather than core issues of separation of powers and indi-
vidual rights, Mathews gave the Court a license to use its own translation of rights in light of
other contemporary concerns and issues .....
96 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531.
97 Id.
98 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quotation and citation omitted).
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mental Protection Agency?9 9 And how should the government mea-
sure the individual liberty interest in not being detained-as the
average price that an average citizen would pay per hour to avoid de-
tention? If these efforts to monetize the prongs of the Mathews test
seem silly, it may be because there is no systematic, rational way to
quantify these competing values. To make matters even more diffi-
cult, the Court requires judges to use these values as guidance for the
procedural features that should attend habeas corpus proceedings for
enemy combatants. The Hamdi Court suggested possible procedures,
such as putting the burden of proof on the detainee to show why he
does not meet the criteria for detention. Nevertheless, the Court
punted the determination of which procedures are constitutional to
the lower courts and the executive branch. 10 0
The practical consequences of Hamdi may outstrip its theoretical
significance. After all, the government has detained only three Ameri-
can citizens as enemy combatants: Yaser Hamdi, John Walker Lindh,
and Jose Padilla. The Bush Administration chose to transfer Lindh
from military detention to the criminal justice system and reached a
plea bargain with prosecutors.10 1 Hamdi renounced his citizenship
and has been released to the custody of Saudi Arabia.10 2 Hamdi, how-
ever, has application far beyond the remaining case of Jose Padilla
because of the Court's decision in Rasul. In Rasul, the Court found
that Guantanamo Bay is within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the
federal courts. 0 3 Effectively overruling Eisentrager, Rasul unwisely
threatens to interject the federal courts as micromanagers of the mili-
tary. It provided no guidance on when or where habeas corpus hear-
ings must be held, who can participate, or how classified intelligence
will remain protected. Despite an extended discussion of the pecu-
liarities of the Guantanamo lease, Rasul leaves unclear even whether
judicial review would apply beyond Cuba to Iraq (and Saddam Hus-
sein) or to Afghanistan (and Osama bin Laden, should he be
captured). 104
99 See, e.g., Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CLU. L. Rrv. 537,
549-51 (2005) (estimating valuation of human life by federal agencies, including the
EPA).
100 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534, 537-39.
101 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement from the Attorney General Re-
garding John Walker Lindh's Guilty Plea (July 15, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2002/July/02_ag_400.htm.
102 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of Mark Corallo, Director of Pub-
lic Affairs, Regarding Yaser Hamdi (Sept. 22, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/
September/04_opa_640.htm.
103 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2004).
104 See id. at 478-79 ("[B]ecause 'the writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the
prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be
unlawful custody,' a district court acts 'within [its] respective jurisdiction' within the mean-
ing of § 2241 as long as 'the custodian can be reached by service of process.'" (second
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Without any discussion of these issues in Rasul, one must assume
that if the approach outlined in Hamdi satisfies the due process re-
quirements for American citizens detained within the United States, it
will likely satisfy the requirements for alien enemy combatants de-
tained outside the United States. Although the Court unwisely ex-
tended its reach to wartime detentions outside the United States, it
left the executive branch substantial room to maneuver on the nature
and scope of review. Hamdi, for example, approves of a detainee's
access to counsel,10 5 but does not explain when they may meet,
whether their communications may be monitored for clandestine
messages, or whether the lawyers may be military officers. Rasul stu-
diously avoids any discussion of what substantive rights, if any, al
Qaeda and Taliban detainees have, and neither decision overturns the
Administration's policy that these detainees are not prisoners of war
under the Geneva Conventions. The Pentagon could easily adapt its
existing review process for Guantanamo prisoners to meet the stan-
dards of Hamdi (as Justice O'Connor seemed to invite) .106 Military
commissions that President Bush has already established to try alien
terrorists would almost certainly meet the procedural requirements
set out by the Court. Thus, the Court's intervention into detainee
policy and its imposition of ambiguous standards for review seem to
require the executive branch to provide process to alien detainees
identical to that given to citizens. That is, the ambiguity of the Ma-
thews framework gives the executive branch little choice but to take up
the one avenue already outlined by the Court. The Court's rulings
threaten to extend not only to the navy brig in Charleston, South Car-
olina, but to Afghanistan, and even Iraq.
IV
WAR AND COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Despite protests to the contrary, Hamdi and Rasul have thrust the
federal courts into the center of policymaking in the war on terrorism.
The courts must decide whether the government should produce cer-
tain kinds of evidence or witnesses (particularly those involving intelli-
gence information and assets), how long it may question detained
enemy combatants before they have access to a lawyer, and how long it
alteration in original) (quoting Braden v. 30th Judicial Court, 410 U.S. 494, 494-95
(1973))). This passage of the Court's opinion will surely be offered as evidence that judi-
cial review for U.S.-held detainees knows no bounds.
105 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (plurality opinion).
106 See id. at 538 ("There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated
could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribu-
nal .... [M] ilitary regulations already provide for such process in related instances, dictat-
ing that tribunals be made available to determine the status of enemy detainees who assert
prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Convention.").
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may hold prisoners. These issues will undoubtedly affect which tactics
and operations the government will be able to use to combat terror-
ism in the future. Because the Supreme Court did not set any clear
lines, but instead directed lower courts merely to balance a multiplic-
ity of ambiguous factors, it seems inevitable that the federal judiciary
will significantly affect terrorism policies. This Part questions whether
the courts have a comparative advantage in the area of foreign policy
and national security, or whether such decisions should be left to the
political branches. In other words, do the federal courts, now charged
with interpreting and applying Hamdi and Rasul, have a superior abil-
ity to gather information to make national security decisions, or even
to conduct the balancing called for by the Supreme Court?
They do not. The design and operation of the judiciary give it a
comparatively weak institutional vantage point from which to manage
foreign affairs and achieve national security goals. To ensure the most
effective pursuit of national policy on terrorism, the responsibility for
policy decisions should be entrusted to the institution within the fed-
eral government that has a structural comparative advantage in mak-
ing such decisions. Because the federal judiciary suffers significant
institutional disadvantages with regard to foreign affairs, it is a poor
choice to carry out national security policy. It is important to distin-
guish between both micro- and macrolevel characteristics of the judi-
ciary. Several characteristics of federal courts at the microlevel-the
operation of individual judges in individual lawsuits-limit the infor-
mation and options available to the courts. At the macrolevel, certain
systemwide features of the Article III judiciary may poorly equip it to
carry out national security policy on a global scale.
A. Microlevel Institutional Factors
The defining function and features of the Article III courts,
which may make them superior to other branches in performing cer-
tain functions, also may make them comparatively less suited to play-
ing a leading national security role. Federal courts are designed to be
independent from politics, to passively allow parties to drive the litiga-
tion, and to receive information in highly formal ways through litiga-
tion. These characteristics may make courts more neutral in their
decision making and fairer in their attitude toward defendants or de-
tainees, but they also may render the courts less effective in achieving
national security goals. Comparing courts with other institutions may
clarify these points.
An initial difference between courts and other institutions is ac-
cess. Compared with other institutions, courts have relatively high
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barriers to access. 10 7 Markets, to take one example, have virtually no
barriers-all one need do to gain access is purchase a product. Con-
gress, to take another example, has somewhat higher barriers than
markets. It is generally thought that interest groups must provide
campaign contributions or political support in order to attain access
to political leaders, though members of Congress are also responsive
to public pressure as reflected through the media and constituents.
The executive branch has lower barriers to access than Congress, be-
cause it is easier for individuals and groups to provide information to,
and make requests of, agencies than Congress, though these lower
barriers may not bring greater chances of success. For members of
Congress, barriers preventing access to the executive branch are ex-
tremely low. In addition to formal hearings, agency officials and con-
gressional staff conduct numerous informal discussions and meetings
in a never-ending dialogue of questions, requests for information, and
responses.10 8
In contrast, courts have numerous doctrines that create high bar-
riers to access. Under standing doctrine, for example, plaintiffs must
have suffered an actual injury in fact that is fairly traceable to a defen-
dant's alleged wrongful conduct, which may be remedied by the
court.'0 9 The timing of the case must also be just right-neither too
early so as to be unripe 10 nor too late so as to be moot.' Of particu-
lar importance to the subject matter at hand, courts cannot answer
political questions whose determination is constitutionally vested in
another branch. 12
In addition to these court-imposed access limitations, the nature
of litigation itself demands significant resources, at least compared
with the means necessary to access the executive or legislative
branches. Utilizing a judicial forum not only requires time and
money to make substantive legal arguments and to pursue discovery,
107 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, Ec,
ONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 123 (1994) ("[T]he adjudicative process is more formally de-
fined and has more formal requirements for participation than do the [political process or
market].").
108 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 623-24 (1984).
109 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("[T]he plaintiff must
have suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."
(citations and quotations omitted)).
110 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947).
III See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974) (dismissing the case of
a law school applicant alleging racial discrimination since he was nearly finished with law
school).
112 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993).
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but also demands navigating complex litigation rules, which often ne-
cessitates hiring teams of lawyers to represent the interested parties.
There are also significant differences in the ways courts acquire
and process information. Parties gather information through a pains-
taking process of discovery, which can be time-consuming and expen-
sive. They present information to the court, which must satisfy the
Federal Rules of Evidence-it must be judged relevant,' 13 credible,' 1 4
and reliable' 15-and it must be presented to the court in accordance
with specific and painstaking procedures. The executive branch, by
contrast, can collect information through agency experts, a national
and global network of officials and agents, and connections with
outside groups and foreign governments. Congress can collect infor-
mation itself or acquire it from the executive branch or outside
groups via relatively 'inexpensive hearings. In general, courts do not
proactively collect information on a question before them. Aside
from public record information, such as that contained in open me-
dia sources or scholarly journals, courts must rely on the parties to
bring information to them. Courts do not operate the broad network
of information sources that is available to the executive branch, nor
can they benefit from the informal methods of information collection
the legislature has at its disposal. Courts generally cannot update the
information available on a question except in the context of a case.
Thus, if a court has made a decision based on information available to
it at a given time, the court will not continue to gather information on
that issue thereafter-even if additional information would lead the
court to change its decision-until another case raising the same issue
arises. Even then, a court generally will not reexamine its earlier deci-
sion unless the new information provided by the parties shows that the
factual context has changed so dramatically as to dictate a departure
from precedent."16
Article III itself also significantly limits the role of federal courts
in performing certain functions. Once the President and Congress
have enacted a statute or the President and Senate have made a treaty,
the judiciary's constitutional responsibility is to execute those goals in
the context of Article III cases or controversies, subject to any poli-
cymaking discretion implicitly given to the courts by Congress in areas
113 FED. R. EVID. 401 (limiting evidence in courts to that which is of "consequence to
the determination of the action").
114 See FED. R. EVID. 601-15 (describing the qualifications for witnesses and the scope
of their potential testimony).
115 See FED. R. EviD. 901-03 (outlining requirements for authentication of physical
evidence).
116 See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis of
the Supreme Court's Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. Rav. 643, 660 (2000).
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of statutory ambiguity or of federal common law. 1 7 Federal judges
cannot alter or refuse to execute laws, even if the original circum-
stances that gave rise to the statute or treaty have changed. If a fed-
eral court, for example, finds that a defendant has violated the Helms-
Burton Act by "trafficking" in property confiscated by the Cuban gov-
ernment, it is obligated to render judgment for an American plaintiff
who once owned that property.' 18 Article III requires a federal court
to reach that decision even if the effects of the judgment in that par-
ticular case would harm the national interest. 19
Judicial decisions may harm the national interest because courts
cannot control the timing of their proceedings or coordinate their
judgments with the actions of the other branches of government. For
example, the President might be engaged in a diplomatic campaign to
pressure a Middle Eastern country into terminating its support for ter-
rorism at the time that a judicial decision freed a suspected al Qaeda
operative. A judicial decision along these lines could undermine the
appearance of unified resolve on the part of the United States, or it
might suggest to the Middle Eastern country that the executive
branch cannot guarantee that it could follow through on its own
counterterrorism policies. A court cannot take account of such naked
policy considerations in deciding whether a federal statute has been
violated or whether to grant relief, while the political branches can
constantly modify policy in reaction to ongoing events. Even if the
judiciary seeks guidance from the executive branch, such deference
may undermine any appearance of judicial independence.
A last microfactor that affects the courts' institutional compe-
tence arises from the substantive challenge presented by international
law. Detention decisions require the federal courts to do more than
simply find facts in applying the enemy combatant standard. 120 De-
tainees may also claim that their manner of capture, treatment, or
conditions of confinement violate international treaties or customary
international law.' 2 ' Federal courts usually do not encounter interna-
tional law. Many observers admit that the very concept of customary
international law-law that "results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation"
117 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 743-56 (5th ed. 2003).
118 See John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms-Burton
Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 747, 774 (1997).
119 See id.
120 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 478-80 (D.D.C. 2005)
(evaluating petitioners' claims based on the Geneva Conventions).
121 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483-85 (2004).
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rather than through positive enactment122-is fraught with
difficulty. 12 3
Even if the very nature of international law were not so uncertain
and ambiguous, it is likely that the federal courts either would experi-
ence a high error rate in determining its content or expend excessive
resources in attempting to reach the appropriate legal answer. Inter-
national law involves sources that are not often encountered by fed-
eral judges or domestic lawyers. The very source of customary
international law-state practice-is not as readily available to courts
as are reported decisions. 124 Moreover, state practice may not be re-
flected in publicly available documents, but may more often lie in the
archives of the State Department and foreign ministries, or may not
even be recorded in documents at all, but might instead rest in the
preserve of unwritten custom. American judges, who are almost all
generalists, would have to survey the actions of governments over the
course of dozens, if not hundreds, of years. Only then could they be-
gin to make fine-grained judgments not just about what states have
done, but why they did it.
An analogy can be made to the disputes over the use of legislative
history in statutory interpretation. Whether courts should consult leg-
islative history has been a focal point for broader debates about the
nature of the legislation, the process of judicial reasoning, and the
purpose of interpretation. Many who believe that courts should seek
out Congress's intent or broader purpose find reliance on legislative
history, along with the judiciary's own policy considerations, generally
acceptable. 12 5 A minority argues that courts should not use legislative
history to interpret statutes, either because there is no such thing as a
122 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
123 Compare ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4
(1971) ("[T]he concept of custom has not been subjected to satisfactory intensive analy-
sis.... The questions of how custom comes into being and how it can be changed or
modified are wrapped in mystery and illogic."), with IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (4th ed. 1990) (citing with approval the definition of international
custom as a recognition among nations of a certain practice as obligatory).
124 See BROWNLIE, supra note 123, at 5 ("The material sources of custom ... include...
diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of official legal
advisers, official manuals on legal questions, e.g. manuals of military law, executive deci-
sions and practices, orders to naval forces etc., comments by governments on drafts pro-
duced by the International Law Commission, state legislation, international and national
judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of trea-
ties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal
questions in the United Nations General Assembly." (citations omitted)).
125 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REv.
1509, 1509-11 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)); William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpre-
tation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 325-32 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip
P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 424-25 (1988).
2006]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
collective intent 26 or because consulting legislative history evades for-
mal separation-of-powers notions. 127 Adrian Vermeule argues that
even if courts should seek legislative intent, those of "limited interpre-
tive competence might do better, even on intentionalist grounds, by
eschewing legislative history than by consulting it."128 Judges simply
may have limited competence in understanding and properly using
legislative history-leading to high decision costs in conducting exten-
sive reviews of legislative history-without any corresponding reduc-
tion (and perhaps even an increase) in error costs.
If judges' limited competence in reviewing legislative history
leads to high decision costs, such costs will be even higher in the con-
text of international law. The sources of legislative history rest well
within the general bounds of American public law, and thus will be
familiar to most judges. Although it is expensive to gather and ana-
lyze in relation to other forms of American legal research,1 29 legisla-
tive history may be inexpensive to use in comparison to sources of
international law-which is often written in foreign languages that
must be translated, found not only in texts but also in practices, and
recorded in sources that are often not publicly available. Even more
conventional public sources of international law, such as multilateral
treaties and the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly,
present serious interpretive problems. It is highly questionable, for
example, that nations that refuse to sign treaties should be held to
those treaty norms because they have "ripened" into custom, or that
customary international law should be read to go beyond the stan-
dards set by a widely joined treaty. Decisions by organs of the United
Nations, particularly the General Assembly, have no formal authority
to declare customary international law, if by definition that law repre-
sents the practice of states and not the opinions of international orga-
nizations. The most pertinent evidence of state practice-state
actions-will sometimes be the most expensive to ascertain, and there
is, as of yet, no empirical showing that federal courts will perform bet-
ter in their use than any other institution.
126 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 61, 68 (1994) ("Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for
a collective body."); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 673, 674-75 (1997).
127 See Manning, supra note 126, at 707-25.
128 Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 84 (2000).
129 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 125, at 1541; Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the
Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE LJ. 371, 377; Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the
Limits ofJudicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833,
1870-71 (1998).
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B. Macrolevel Institutional Factors
The organization of the federal judiciary as an institution may
have even more significant effects on the comparative ability of the
courts to achieve national security goals than the microlevel factors.
First, the federal judiciary is a generalist institution composed of
generalist judges. The executive branch does not usually appoint
members of the judiciary because of expertise a candidate may possess
in any particular subject, unlike the Department of Energy, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, or the Food and Drug Administration,
which hire specialized scientists. The lack of specialized judicial ex-
pertise is accentuated in foreign affairs. Judges are not usually chosen
because of any background in specific regions, nor are they selected
because they have experience in national security issues. As an institu-
tion, the judiciary is unlikely to have great facility with international
legal, political, or economic theories or materials; its members are
more likely to be chosen because of their prominence as litigators or
as public officials. Very few judges have significant foreign affairs ex-
perience before their appointment to the federal bench. Moreover, a
candidate's prominence in the field of public international law or in-
ternational relations theory would not be a strong selling point for a
nominee.
Similarly, the federal judiciary itself is organized along generalist
lines. Aside from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the
federal courts are organized by geographic region, not by subject mat-
ter as are some European judicial systems. This system of organization
not only prevents specialization, but also retards the accumulation of
experience and hampers the internal transmission of information be-
tween judges handling common issues. For example, few judges have
any special background in arms control issues. Even if a judge gains
significant knowledge about arms control through a particular case,
this experience will not be retained or put to use in future cases on
the same subjects because of the generalist organization of the judici-
ary. In fact, it is highly unlikely that that judge would hear cases on
the same subject again.
A second macrolevel institutional factor relevant to the courts'
comparative ability to achieve national security goals is that the judici-
ary is the most decentralized of the three branches of government. It
is the most balkanized, if also the most deliberate. The front line of
the judiciary is composed of ninety-four district courts, which are
staffed by more than 667judges. 130 Until appellate courts have ruled
130 JUDGESHIP ANALYSIS STAFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, HISTORY OF FEDERAL
JUDGESHIPS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 111-22 tbl. H, http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tableh.
pdf.
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on a legal issue, the judges in these district courts can hold ninety-four
different interpretations of the same law. There are thirteen federal
courts of appeals, with 179 judges.1 31 The Supreme Court currently
hears between seventy and eighty-five cases per year, while about
60,000 cases a year are filed in the courts of appeal and about 325,000
cases are filed a year in the district courts.' 3 2 Given the other de-
mands on the Supreme Court's caseload, it is doubtful that the Court
could devote a significant portion of its docket to correcting errone-
ous interpretations of international law or mistaken interferences with
regard to foreign and national security policies set by the political
branches. Unless the Supreme Court could review more cases, the
geographic organization of the federal courts may produce dishar-
mony, or at least an undesirable diversity of interpretations and appli-
cations of international law and foreign policy.
In some areas of law, this level of decentralization might not pose
such a problem. Geographically organized courts may better tailor
national policies to local conditions, allow for diversity and even ex-
perimentation in federal policies, as well as provide a more effective
voice for local communities in federal judicial decision making.
These are not desirable traits, however, in foreign affairs and national
security. The Constitution specifically sought to centralize authority
over these subjects to provide the nation with a single voice in its inter-
national relations, so as to prevent other nations from taking advan-
tage of the disarray that had characterized the Articles of
Confederation. 13 Indeed, the Court recently held in Crosby v. Na-
tional Foreign Trade Council1 34 and American Insurance Ass'n v.
Garamendi 1 5 that state efforts to influence the conduct of foreign na-
tions are preempted by federal policy precisely because of the need
for a uniform foreign policy set by Congress or the President. This
rationale, offered to justify national preeminence over the fifty states,
applies with equal force to a federal judiciary of ninety-four district
131 JUDGESHIP ANALYSIS STAFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, HISTORY OF FEDERAL
JUDGESHIPS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS tbl. C, http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tablec.pdf.
132 OFFICE OFJUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2003, at 6, http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2003/
front/Mar03Txt.pdf.
133 See generally FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1986) (exploring the origin of the Constitution in the
context of foreign affairs during the period preceding the Constitution's inception).
134 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (finding that federal law preempted a Massachusetts
statute barring state entities from buying goods or services from companies that did busi-
ness with the nation of Burma).
135 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003) (invalidating a California statute on the basis that it im-
permissibly interfered with the federal government's conduct of foreign relations, because
it required insurance companies doing business in California to disclose all information
relating to policies sold in Europe by the company or anyone "related to it" between 1920
and 1945).
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courts and thirteen appellate courts. The geographic factors that usu-
ally led to judicial specialization are not present in the foreign affairs
context. Unlike the Second Circuit and securities law, there is no nat-
ural geographic center for matters that affect international relations,
and unlike the D.C. Circuit and administrative law, the habeas corpus
statute does not require that detainee suits be brought in a specific
court of appeals-in fact, Rasul seems to suggest that enemy combat-
ants held outside the United States could bring suits in any of the
federal district courts.136 Judicial involvement in foreign and national
security policy will create disharmony where uniformity is crucial.
Third, institutional structure also suggests that judicial activity in
national security may be slow in implementation and self-correction.
Lawsuits often take years to complete, and even when cases are expe-
dited, they last for several months from the time of filing to final judg-
ment and appeal. The enemy combatant cases-in which the legal
issues were clear, no discovery was needed, and detainees had signifi-
cant liberty interests in a swift resolution-still required roughly two
to three years for a decision on the threshold substantive questions.
The prosecution of Zacarias Moussoui, detained in the fall of 2001,
has only recently been resolved by a guilty plea.137 Although these
cases may be proceeding quickly by judicial standards, the important
question is whether, as a matter of comparative institutional compe-
tence, the executive or other branches can implement foreign policy
goals even faster.
Monitoring and feedback in the judicial system may also cause
delay. Judicial errors or deviations from policy may take years to re-
verse or may even go entirely uncorrected. Problems of delay also
infect the judiciary's institutional systems for communication between
its different units and for correcting errors. While the federal courts
have an appeals court system for detecting and correcting errors, an
appeal can take months if not years to resolve. Even if a district or
circuit judge acts in defiance of established circuit or Supreme Court
precedent, litigation is necessary to correct the error. Standards of
review concerning factfinding may even render some decisions effec-
tively immune from appellate review despite contrary or conflicting
136 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) ("Congress has granted federal district
courts, within their respective jurisdictions, the authority to hear applications for habeas
corpus by any person who claims to be held in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States." (quotation omitted)).
137 See Neil A. Lewis, Surprise Terror Plea Leaves Unresolved Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2005, at A30 ("Zacarias Moussaoui's sudden decision this week to plead guilty... provided
administration prosecutors with an unassailable victory. But it may also leave unresolved
many important issues, most notably the roiling debate over whether terrorist suspects can
be effectively prosecuted in America's civilian courts, which grant numerous rights to
defendants.").
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results reached by different trial courts in similar cases. Transmission
of information identifying and correcting errors may become dis-
torted within the system, which causes the repeated cycles of appeal
and remand that can occur in the context of a single case. 138
The judiciary's institutional characteristics render it superior to
other institutions for certain kinds of decisions. The judiciary is able
to address issues more fairly, because it can operate with less interfer-
ence from the political branches, and it can implement federal policy
over a wide number of cases throughout the country. Additionally, it
can help solve political commitment problems among interest groups
or branches of government due to its high level of insulation from
outside political control and influence, thus allowing the judiciary to
enforce commercial or political bargains neutrally. Thejudiciary's vir-
tues, however, also create its problems as an institutional actor in for-
eign affairs and national security. Its evenhandedness and passivity
create problems in effectively gathering and processing information
and in coordinating its policies with other national actors. Its proce-
dural fairness and geographic decentralization prevent it from acting
swiftly in a unified fashion, and it lacks effective tools for the rapid
assimilation of feedback and the correction of errors.
CONCLUSION
Despite the judiciary's comparative institutional weakness in for-
eign policy, the federal courts should not be wholly removed from
review of the detention of American citizens as enemy combatants.
The Court has decided Hamdi and Rasul, essentially overruling Eisen-
trager. While this course will likely prove to be misguided, it is certain
that federal courts will play a role in making terrorism policy (unless
Congress and the President cooperate and swiftly enact a new habeas
statute to govern enemy combatant cases, which appears unlikely so
far). Nevertheless, these decisions provide broad discretion to lower
courts in shaping procedures. Decisions must also be made about the
timing of detainees' access to lawyers, whether Miranda rights139 will
be invoked, what evidence must be produced, whether witnesses must
appear, and what standard of review to apply to the military's deci-
sions. Decisions still must be made about the level of deference, if
any, that courts will provide to the executive's interpretation and ap-
plication of international law, such as the Geneva Conventions. Even
138 See Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, 1J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 129-30
(1972).
139 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("[T]he prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination.").
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if the Court has rejected the "some evidence" test,140 it still might
adopt the deference afforded to executive agency decision making
under the arbitrary and capricious standard and Chevron deference. '41
The decisions to come will fall on a spectrum between outright
de novo review according to standards similar to those of the criminal
justice system and a standard more deferential to the political
branches. The analysis here seeks to point out the institutional diffi-
culties that the courts will encounter in attempting to play a de novo
role in reviewing national security decisions during the war on terror-
ism. All too often these decisions are characterized in terms of the
policy goal sought, without regard to the second-order question of rel-
ative institutional capabilities. Rather than ask itself whether it can
balance security against liberty interests-obviously it can choose
some point on the policy spectrum-the judiciary ought to ask itself
whether the other branches could strike a better balance based on
more informed judgment. Given the micro- and macroinstitutional
problems with courts, the judiciary may undermine, rather than pro-
mote, national security policy in the war on terrorism by overestimat-
ing its abilities and refusing to afford deference to the political
branches.
140 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004) (plurality opinion).
141 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(deferring to agency interpretations of congressional statutes where there is no clear
meaning and where the interpretation is a reasonable construction of the statute's
language).
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